

Second Report on OPORA's Observation Findings of 31 March 2019 Presidential Election

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REPORT ELECTIONS

Formation of district election commissions and beginning of their work were two main stages of election administration during the reporting period. Despite some difficulties on the stage of holding the first meetings, DECAs are ready to administer the election. These commissions guarantee a wide representation of candidates for the President of Ukraine. However, unfortunately, there are still manipulations around quotas of “technical candidates”.

Misuse of administrative resources and transparency of campaign financing were two major challenges in February, aimed at guaranteeing the quality of election process.

Although some candidates for the President of Ukraine have a practical opportunity to misuse administrative resources at national and local levels, the combination of in-office and campaigning activities of a Ukrainian presidential candidate Petro Poroshenko causes major problems. The effective President should make a clear distinction between his official duties and campaigning activities.

Another important task is to prevent the use of state and local social and other budget programs for the benefit of certain candidates holding offices in state authorities.

To prevent misuse of administrative resources, state authorities should stick to their areas of responsibility and division of powers. In other words, state bodies responsible for pensions and housing subsidies should get an exclusive authority to inform citizens about these issues. Candidates for the President of Ukraine, on the other hand, must be excluded from the process of communication on these payments from the State Budget of Ukraine and local budgets. Such state policy will enhance the principle of equal opportunities for Ukrainian presidential candidates, and to competitiveness of the election process.

To prevent distortion of election outcomes, law-enforcement bodies should make every effort to timely investigate each reported incident with signs of voter bribery. OPORA's observers did not notice any incidents related to voter bribery by the scheme “a vote for illegal incentive”. However, statements of SBU (Security Service of Ukraine) about the organization of vote-buying in the interests of the candidate Yuliya Tymoshenko, and information about monetary rewards paid to campaigners of a candidate Petro Poroshenko should be promptly investigated.

It is important to avoid any delays and promptly investigate into the reported activities of candidates or their representatives to prevent public suspicion about political motivation of law-enforcement bodies and other enforcement agencies. OPORA emphasizes that it is necessary to prevent any confrontations between law-enforcement bodies of Ukraine while violations of electoral legislation are being evaluated from a legal perspective.

In February, the CEC provided an explanation on the issue of vote-buying and the peculiarities of engaging citizens into campaigning activities in favour of Ukrainian presidential candidates. According to this Explanatory Statement, administrators of election funds of candidates shall have the right to sign only unsalaried contracts with voters for conducting campaigning activities. On the other hand, there can be costs due to incurred due campaigning activities can be reimbursed to voters (transport, travel, telephone calls costs, etc.).

Stating the importance of regulating costs of candidates to organize campaigning activities and their staff support, the Explanatory Statement approved by the Commission does not include any mechanism to control the legality of reimbursing costs to citizens engaged in organization of electoral campaigning. With no efficient system of control and verification of such costs in place, and with no actual accountability of contracted legal entities who manage election funds, the investigations of facts of vote-

buying could be doubted. It is due to the fact that on the level of legislation and of the by-laws, there is currently no tools to prevent the cases of offering illegitimate benefits to voters in the form of reimbursement of costs for logistics of campaigning activities. OPORA suggest the current Explanatory Statement of the CEC shall be reviewed with engagement a wide circle of experts in the field election and financial operations.

On February, 18, 2019, the CEC established 199 district election commissions with the key functions to enroll polling station commissions and confirming to ascertain voting outcomes within the territorial constituencies. The process of establishing district election commissions ran in a transparent way and with the CEC's compliance with all legal requirements and the timelines of elections.

43 of 44 presidential candidates obtained the desired representation in the DEC's, according to the number of candidates submitted thereto. Thus, 32 candidates received the maximum or near maximum number of members in the DEC's composition. One candidate only (Arkadiy Kornatskyi) failed to submit any candidates for the DEC membership. The distribution of senior positions in the DEC's membership is rather well-balanced and proportionate. The total number of commissions established as of February, 18, 2019, is 7,355 persons (55% of women, and 45% of men).

The numerical composition of the established district election commissions is on average three times exceeding the lowest required norm on the number of commission members (12 persons), and makes 37 persons. The smallest DEC of all includes 29 persons, the largest has 43. The number of persons included into election commissions is slightly excessive in terms of their efficient performance of functions and high quality decision making. It could complicate the activities of the election commissions but at the same time, it is an additional factor for cross-control, and the preventive factor against the monopolist impact on the commission operations by certain candidates.

Vast majority of meetings of district election commissions did have a problem of low participation of the DEC's members in the first sessions but they still took place within the term stipulated by the law. According to OPORA estimates, about 41% of DEC's members did not show up for the first meetings of commissions. It suggests that the candidates as electoral actors are not disciplined and responsible enough in making lists of candidate to be delegated to election commissions, as they enter some persons there who are not prepared to fulfil the functions assigned to them. Thus, of the 197 candidates submitted to DEC's by Vitaliy Kupriy, 157 persons (or 80%) failed to attend the first DEC meeting. Similar negative attendance rates of the first meetings are also found about other DEC members submitted by other candidates, such as Viktor Bondar (79% of absentees), Oleksandr Vashchenko (74%), Ihor Shevchenko (69%), Oleksandr Danyliuk (64%), Yuriy Tymoshenko (56%), Oleksandr Moroz (55%), Vitaliy Skotsyk (52%).

As the official registration of candidates finished, intensity and scale of campaigning has increased. At the same time, the number of active candidates, who organize various public campaigning events, is not more than 26-28 persons. Other candidates do not run any noticeable and targeted work to mobilize and convince voters. Leaders in electoral campaigning in terms of geographical outreach and combination of various forms of campaigning are still Petro Poroshenko, Yuliya Tymoshenko, and Oleh Liashko. The peculiarity of this reporting period is the fact that in late January and early February, some candidates resumed large-scale campaigning tours, after a short break. Such regional visits were often followed by engaging into campaigning activities supporters from party activists, local deputies, and less frequently – officials from local self-government.

We are concerned about incidents involving use of force against campaigning efforts of candidates for the President of Ukraine. Thus, such obstruction to campaigning included ruffian actions against campaigners, damaging the political advertising on outdoor advertising means. These incidents should have become a sign for law-enforcement bodies of Ukraine urging to prevent any obstruction to campaigning activities.

In February, the case have declined of disseminating campaigning printed materials without any source data thereon, but observers keep detecting such. Thus, CEC, NAZK, and the National Police must enhance the efficiency of activities in compliance with the law in terms of electoral campaigning and its funding.

During the forthcoming presidential election, there has been recorded a record-hitting numbers of civil society organizations entitled to do observations over the electoral process. Of 139 CSOs, 85 organizations fail to have any observation experience in the elections in Ukraine, over 30 NGOs are directly linked to the interests of presidential candidates of Ukraine. The situation is favourable for politically motivated actions of the quasi observation entities in the interests of certain election actors.

ESTABLISHMENT AND LAUNCH OF OPERATIONS OF DISTRICT ELECTION COMMISSIONS

Establishing district election commissions

Central Election Commission, in line with all the stipulated procedures and within the term assigned by the law (before February, 18) established district election commissions in each territorial election district to host the voting on March, 31, 2019. In total, 199 district election commissions were established in 24 regions of Ukraine and in the city of Kyiv Resolution of CEC No.331 of February, 18, 2019). In view of the fact of temporary occupation of part of the territory of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, 26 district election commissions failed to be established, as expected, (12 DEC – in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and in Sevastopol, 9 DEC – in Donetsk oblast, 5 DEC – in Luhansk oblast). It was a forced and well-justified decision of the CEC preconditioned by lack of due conditions within these areas for free expression of will of citizens and for comprehensive provision of safety.

Each of the 44 officially registered candidates had a right to submit at least one person to the composition of one election commission. Since for presidential elections, the law does not set any restrictions on the maximum allowed number of members in the DEC – all candidates nominating their delegates did obtain the seats in the commissions. All the 199 DEC received delegates from 17 presidential candidates, 15 more candidates submitted their nominees to almost all DEC. Thus, 2/3 presidential candidates used the chance to nominated their delegates to DEC to the maximum. Three presidential candidates (Serhiy Kryvonos, Inna Bohoslovka, Oleksandr Vashchenko) delegated their representatives to the composition of almost half of the established DEC. Other three candidates (Hennadiy Balashov, Dmytro Dobrodomov, and Dmytro Hnap) delegated their representatives to under 10% of DEC. One candidate only, Arkadiy Kornatskyi, failed to submit any delegates to DEC.

As to presidential candidates having their representatives in DEC in absolutely all regions of Ukraine, there are 33 of them. Roman Bezsmertnyi failed to submit any delegates to DEC only in Ivano-Frankivsk and Odesa regions. **Ihor Smeshko** did not delegate anyone to Kirovohrad and Kherson oblasts. In four regions, DEC do not have delegates from **Serhiy Kryvonos**, seven regions lack delegates from **Yevhen Murayev** and **Inna Bohoslovka**. The geography of representation in the DEC membership from other candidates is less ramified.

The least popular regions among the candidates are Transcarpathia, Kirovohrad, and Rivne oblasts. In each of the regions, eight presidential candidates failed to submit their nominees to the DEC. The opposite situation is found in the DEC of Kharkiv oblast where no representatives were delegated from two candidates only – **Dmytro Dobrodomov** and **Arkadiy Kornatskyi**.

Parallel to establishing district election commissions members, CEC also distributed all categories of senior positions (chair, deputy chair, and a secretary of election commission). The process of composing commissions and distribution of managerial positions went with the use of the unified information analytical system “Vybory” which minimized the risk of manipulations or mistakes. Thus, OPORA failed to identify any facts of multiple inclusion of the same people into the composition of different DEC. Almost all candidates obtained from 7% to 9% of senior positions in correlation with the total number of delegates each of them submitted to DEC. Hennadiy Balashov has a slightly larger representation (11% of senior positions in the membership of DEC) which is due to the results of allocating a small number of delegates he nominated (19 persons only, two of whom received senior positions).

In general, the CEC managed to comply with the principle of proportionality and distributed the senior positions among the delegating subjects in a well-balanced manner, depending on the total number of persons nominated by each candidate. The same concerns the compliance with the provision on the approximately equal territorial distribution of positions obtained by representatives of each delegating subject.

Upon the whole, as of February, 18, 2019, **7,355** persons were engaged in the work of election commissions. Due to a large number of registered candidates the risk of incompleteness of DEC members or their minimum admissible composition (12 persons) was low. Average (median) number of members on the list of DEC members established as of February, 18, was 37 persons. Numerically, the largest DEC has 41 persons No.174 and No.176 in Kharkiv oblast), the smallest number of members – 29 persons – is recorded in the DEC No.105 (Luhansk oblast). At the 2004 presidential election, the average numerical composition of DEC members was notably higher and made 43 persons.

65% of DEC members have had previous work experience in election commissions. Over the previous electoral cycles, there has been a slight decrease in the share of persons with previous work experience in the district election commissions. In the 2010 presidential election, 78% of members had previous experience in district election commissions; in 2014 – 72%.

In terms of gender, the DEC members composition is gender-balanced – 55% of women and 45% of men. The same refers to the managerial share of the DEC members where the distribution is 58% women to 42% men. The largest number of women in DEC members was delegated from the presidential candidate **Yuliya Lytvynenko** (share of women - 69%). The smallest number of women in the DEC members were delegated from **Ihor Smeshko** and **Oleksandr Danyliuk** (not taking into account **Dmytro Hnup** and **Hennadiy Balashov** who generally delegated very few nominees). There are also some regional differences – the most of women are found in DEC members in Rivne, Kherson, and Volyn oblasts (62% in each), the smallest share – in Transcarpathia region (40%).

Gender distribution in DEC members membership in terms of delegates nominated by candidates

Ranking	Candidates	Number of DEC members	% of women	men):
1	Yuliya Lytvynenko	199	69%	31%
2	Vasyl Zhuravlov	199	68%	32%
3	Oleksandr Vilkul	199	67%	33%
4	Serhiy Nosenko	198	66%	34%
5	Vitaliy Kupriy	196	65%	35%
6	Inna Bohoslovska	89	65%	35%
7	Dmytro Dobrodomov	14	64%	36%
8	Volodymyr Petrov	199	63%	37%
9	Petro Poroshenko	199	61%	39%
10	Oleh Liashko	199	61%	39%
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35	Ihor Shevchenko	190	48%	52%
36	Volodymyr Zelenskyi	199	47%	53%
37	Yevhen Murayev	150	45%	55%

38	Ruslan Koshulynskyi	199	45%	55%
39	Nalyvaichenko Valentyn	199	45%	55%
40	Viktor Kryvenko	198	44%	56%
41	Oleksandr Danyliuk	197	41%	59%
42	Ihor Smeshko	180	41%	59%
43	Hennadiy Balashov	19	32%	68%
44	Dmytro Hnap	11	27%	73%

A big number of persons in the composition of the newly established commissions also highlights the problem of shadow funding of operations of DEC members. The law provides for reimbursement of labour only for some members of commissions (max. 4 persons). Therefore, out of the total composition of DEC members, not more than 11% of commission members work on the paid basis. However, in practice, delegating subjects often resort to financial incentives for performance of election commission members, which is exercised in a concealed way, and is one of the key challenges in the context of providing transparency of financial expenses of candidates.

First Meetings of District Election Commissions

Election commission enters upon its powers from the moment of swearing an oath by at least two thirds of its members at the first meeting of the DEC. The district election commissions were obliged to convene their first meetings before February, 20, inclusive. OPORA observers conducted monitoring of the first meetings of DEC members by personally attending meetings of most DEC members and collecting additional information remotely.

98% of the total number of all established DEC members organized their first meetings within the term allocated by the law (of them, 32% of commissions came to a meeting on February, 19, 66% of commissions – on February, 20). 2% of commissions (DECs No.119 and No.125 in Lviv oblast, No.130 in Mykolayiv oblast, and No.105 in Luhansk oblast) held first meetings slightly exceeding the deadlines. In general, at least 17 district election commissions failed to hold meetings on the first attempt due to insufficient quorum required to swear an oath by DEC members. Despite the fact, they managed to meet the terms specified by the law to hold the first meeting.

None of the election commissions met for their first meeting with complete attendance. The average number of absentees at meetings of each commission was 10 persons. Upon the whole, according to OPORA's provisional estimates, about 41% of the total number of members (3,047 persons) failed to attend the first meetings of DEC members. At the same time, in over half of the established DEC members, the first meetings were not attended by the senior management (chair, deputy chair, or a secretary).

Over 300 persons (or 4% of the total number) included into the composition of DEC members refused to act on the commission. Another key reason of absence was the fact of their remote residence in other regions of Ukraine. Thus, over 8% of DEC members live in other regions from locations where the DEC members were established. Besides, 5% of commission members have not been reached to be invited to participate in the first DEC meeting.

The most disciplined members of commissions were those delegated by the candidate Petro Poroshenko, – 3% only failed to attend the first DEC meeting. The same high attendance rates of the first DEC meetings are recorded for candidates delegated by **Volodymyr Petrov, Oleh Liashko, Ruslan Ryhovanov, and Yuliya Tymoshenko (4-5% of the absent members)**. Instead, the first meetings were not attended by over half of delegates nominated to DEC members by **Vitaliy Skotsyk (52%)**,

Oleksandr Moroz (55%), Yuriy Tymoshenko (56%), Oleksandr Danyliuk (64%), Ihor Shevchenko (69%), Oleksandr Vashchenko (74%), Viktor Bondar (79%), and Vitaliy Kupriy (80%).

Attendance rates of the first meetings by DEC members delegated from each candidate

Ranking	Candidate	Number of persons in the DEC	Number of absentees	% of absentees
1	Petro Poroshenko	199	6	3%
2	Oleh Liashko	199	8	4%
3	Ruslan Ryhovanov	199	8	4%
4	Volodymyr Petrov	199	7	4%
5	Yuliya Tymoshenko	199	10	5%
6	Yuliya Lytvynenko	199	16	8%
7	Yuriy Boyko	199	16	8%
8	Oleksandr Vilkul	199	15	8%
9	Andriy Sadovyi	196	17	9%
10	Oleksandr Shevchenko	199	20	10%
11	Anatoliy Hrytsenko	199	19	0,1
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34	Dmytro Hnap	11	5	45%
35	Yuriy Derevyanko	197	88	45%
36	Vitaliy Skotsyk	193	101	52%
37	Oleksandr Moroz	198	109	55%
38	Yuriy Tymoshenko	194	108	56%
39	Oleksandr Danyliuk	197	126	64%
40	Ihor Shevchenko	190	131	69%

41	Oleksandr Vashchenko	87	64	74%
42	Viktor Bondar	197	156	79%
43	Vitaliy Kupriy	196	157	80%

As to persons who had the right to attend the DEC meetings, the most active group was that of media representatives who attended the meetings 138 DEC (70% of commissions), and observers from foreign countries who attended the meetings of 29 DEC (15% of commissions).

CAMPAIGNING ACTIVITIES OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

Upon their registration at the CEC, candidates, now in the status of electoral actors, officially started holding activities of electoral campaigning. Of the 44 registered candidates, 26 of them are running noticeable election campaigns. Activities of others are rather sporadic or limited to the media presence in printed media or on TV.

Over the last month, there has been a slight increase in activities among Ukrainian presidential candidates and their teams, as compared to the previous monitoring period when early campaigning was recorded.

In general, the most active presidential candidates were those nominated by political parties, and the candidates who declared their intentions to run for presidency with support of political parties, rather than self-nominated.

The most frequently used forms of campaigning included placing of outdoor advertising (billboards, city lights, banners), placing of political advertising in media (television, online outlets, printed media), putting up street stands, dissemination of party newspapers and other printed materials, holding meetings with voters and public events.

In February, the largest scale campaigning activities in terms of area coverage and use of various types of campaigning were run by three presidential candidates – **Petro Poroshenko, Yuliya Tymoshenko, and Oleh Liashko**. Slightly less intense and complex were the campaigns of **Andriy Sadovyi and Anatoliy Hrytsenko**. The third group of most active candidates who used only some types of campaigning or focused on certain regions only includes **Volodymyr Zelenskyi** (the large scale type included only outdoor advertising and campaigning in online media), **Ruslan Koshulynskyi** (the campaign is run only in certain regions), **Oleksandr Shevchenko** (manifold campaign is run in most regions but the format of street campaigns is used only to a limited extent), **Oleksandr Vilkul, Yuriy Boyko, Serhiy Taruta** (all the three of them run active campaigns only in some regions of Ukraine).

The least noticeable in their campaigning activities were **Yuliya Lytvynenko, Serhiy Nosenko, Serhiy Kryvonos, Roman Nasirov, Oleksandr Moroz, Oleksandr Danyliuk, Mykola Haber, Inna Bohoslovska, Volodymyr Petrov, Vitaliy Kupriy, Arkadiy Kornatskyi, Vitaliy Skotsyk**.

Despite the fact that about half of presidential candidates (21 persons) used the campaigning on outdoor advertising media this type of campaigning was still the most frequently used in February, as compared to other forms of campaigning. OPORA observers recorded outdoor advertising (on a medium and large scale) in all regions of Ukraine by six candidates: **Petro Poroshenko, Yuliya Tymoshenko, Oleh Liashko, Andriy Sadovyi, Anatoliy Hrytsenko, and Volodymyr Zelenskyi**. The same candidates were the most active in the campaigning component of Internet media.

As to regional audiovisual media used for campaigning purposes, in addition to **Petro Poroshenko, Yuliya Tymoshenko, Oleh Liashko, Andriy Sadovyi, Anatoliy Hrytsenko, and Volodymyr Zelenskyi**, they were also actively used in February by **Yuriy Boyko, Oleksandr Vilkul, Serhiy Taruta, and Ruslan Koshulynskyi**.

The scale of campaigning has largely increased in the format of street stands and dissemination of party newspapers and other printed materials through them. This form of campaigning was used by offices of **Petro Poroshenko, Yuliya Tymoshenko, Anatoliy Hrytsenko, Andriy Sadovyi, Oleh Liashko, and Ruslan Koshulynskiy.**

The intensity has grown for street campaigns and meetings with voters with **Oleh Liashko, Yuliya Tymoshenko, and Petro Poroshenko** taking the lead, while the same kinds of activities are lower scale with **Andriy Sadovyi, Anatoliy Hrytsenko, and Ruslan Koshulynskiy.**

Cases of pre-electoral charity are not en mass but in February, observers did record several cases of using such forms of illegitimate impact on voters employed by **Oleksandr Shevchenko and Oleh Liashko.**

Vast majority of charitable campaigning activities were not directly related to presidential election, and are implemented in the interests of current people's deputies who are not presidential candidates themselves. Most of the cases were recorded by observers in Ivano-Frankivsk and Kharkiv oblasts.

REGIONAL VISITS OF CANDIDATES

In February, 2019, 28 presidential candidates made 167 visits to different regions of Ukraine as part of their campaigning activities. The leaders in the number of Ukrainian regions visited in February, 2019, are **Oleh Liashko** (13 oblasts), and also **Anatoliy Hrytsenko, Yuliya Tymoshenko, and Andriy Sadovyi** (visited 11 oblasts each). In fact, these candidates launched their fully-fledged campaigning tours that turned out to be much broader scale in the number of covered regions than observed in the previous campaign periods. Moreover, this component of campaigning has been embarked on more actively by **Valentyn Nalyvaychenko, Serhiy Taruta, Vitaliy Kupriy, and Serhiy Kaplin.** The dynamics of regional visits of last month leaders **Petro Poroshenko and Ruslan Koshulynskiy** kept on the same level but as contrasted to higher activities of other candidates, their performance is average (6 and 7 visited oblasts, respectively). In February, 2019, **Volodymyr Zelenskiy** started his campaigning tour and visited 7 oblasts of Ukraine.

Regional visits of **Ruslan Koshulynskiy** that were most intense in the number of held events and visited settlements were only limited to the regions of western Ukraine, which produced most votes for Svoboda All-Ukrainian Union in the previous election (Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Ternopil, Zhytomyr, Rivne oblasts). Moreover, **Ruslan Koshulynskiy** was very active visiting localities in Kyiv oblast.

In addition to **Ruslan Koshulynskiy**, other leaders in the number of held events within their regional visits were **Andriy Sadovyi, Oleh Liashko, and Yuliya Tymoshenko.** However, as compared to other three candidates, **Andriy Sadovyi** lags far behind them in the number of settlements visited within the regions while focusing rather on big cities.

In the context of regional visits, the most popular among presidential candidates are Lviv and Kharkiv oblasts visited by 10 candidates each. The popular destinations for regional visits were also Kyiv, Zhytomyr, and Poltava oblasts. One candidate only (**Anatoliy Hrytsenko**) visited Chernivtsi oblast. Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts were visited by two candidates – **Serhiy Taruta and Oleh Liashko.** Likewise, only two candidates – **Valentyn Nalyvaychenko and Vitaliy Kupriy** – made regional visits to Volyn oblast.

BREACH OF ELECTION LAW

CASES OF FAILURE ON DEMOCRATIC ELECTION STANDARDS

Vote-buying. Cases with signs of material incentives for voters.

A key event in the reporting period was the notification from the Security Service of Ukraine on the investigation of the process of establishing an illegal network of vote-buying headed by two people's deputies of Ukraine – members of the faction of "Batkivshchyna" AUU **Valeriy Dubel and Ruslan Bohdan.** According to SBU, the process of preparing the illegal technique of vote-buying was initiated back before the official start of the electoral process and went on in January, 2019. As emphasized by

the SBU, the organization of the scheme of election fraud engaged some citizens of Russian Federation, and involved cash of unlawful origin. Deputy head of SBU, Viktor Kononenko declared about the intentions of a group of persons to spend USD 82 mln. for the illegal voting technology. Representatives of the presidential candidate **Yuliya Tymoshenko** contested the claims of SBU stating that actions of special services were politically motivated.

As of the moment of publication of the report, law-enforcement bodies have not informed on the service of suspicion on committing a crime to any specific person, or on detaining participants suspected of applying the illegal technology. With regard to the fast pace of electoral process, OPORA calls on the law-enforcement bodies to timely conduct the investigation and in case of any grounds identified, to get to the required procedural action. To avoid any suspicions of the intent to impact the course of the campaign, SBU needs to make public the additional evidence for committing illegal actions by persons linked to representatives of the presidential candidate Yuliya Tymoshenko.

During the reporting period, OPORA observers have not recorded any cases of offering money to voters or other illegitimate benefits for casting the vote. Instead, some identified cases confirm the need to enhance control over the use of financial resources during elections and the sources of their origin. For example, by means of personal observation, observers received information on promises coming from representatives of one of the district election offices of Yuliya Tymoshenko in the city of Dnipro to pay to voters for their participation in the demonstration in support of the candidate that took place on February, 05, 2019 . Thereat, voters were promised a remuneration also for engaging other citizens to participate in the event in support of the candidate.

Activities of groups of campaigners supporting Ukrainian presidential candidates remain non-transparent and risky for the process of compliance with the election standards. For example, in Mykolayiv oblast, there grounds to suggest that respondents in the polling to identify supporters of the current President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko receive monetary remuneration for job done. In this region, payments are probably made on behalf of the “Institute for Development and Promotion of Democracy” NGO, and are controlled with the help of issuing to citizens an embossed card with the QR-code. Similar practices are recorded also in other regions of Ukraine in favour of this candidate. Current law prohibits paying for services of campaigners, which is related to the need to prevent cases of material incentives for voters, and to the lack of efficient control mechanisms over payments to citizens.

CEC approved the Explanatory Statement on the provisions of part six, Art. 64 of the Law of Ukraine “On Election of the President of Ukraine” thus trying to regulate the practices of engaging citizens into campaigning activities in favour of candidates. Part six of Article 64 of the Law of Ukraine “On Election of the President of Ukraine” bans the campaigning followed by giving money to voters, or goods, services, works, securities, loans, lotteries either free of charge or on preferential terms. This kind of election campaigning or giving money to voters, or goods, services, works, securities, loans, lotteries either free of charge or on preferential terms accompanied by calls or suggestions to vote or not to vote for a certain candidate, or by mentioning his/her name, shall be deemed as vote-buying.

The same provision of the law bans conclusion of paid contracts with voters on conducting campaigning, at the expense of the election fund. This ban to pay for campaigning services of voters caused public opposition between candidates and mutual allegations on establishing groups of campaigners.

In the Explanatory Statement, the CEC qualifies payment of money to campaigners not as an indirect vote-buying but as non-compliance with bans and/or limitations set by the Law on due conduct of electoral campaigning.

According to the CEC’s suggestion, the analysis to confirm the fact of vote-buying in both criminal and administrative proceedings, shall investigate and identify the fact of calls or suggestions to vote or not to vote for a certain candidate, or of mentioning his/her name.

Explanatory Statement of the CEC clearly specifies that participation of voters in implementing electoral campaigning can be done only on the grounds of unsalaried contracts on campaigning. However, according to the CEC, the right to conclude such contracts is secured right by the Constitution of Ukraine, and cannot be restricted. Instead, a contract with the legal entity on organizing and /or holding of election campaigning, and/or dissemination of campaigning materials can include the obligations of the service

provider to enroll, train, and coordinate natural persons directly engaged in the implementation of election campaigning events.

Provisions of the CEC Explanatory Statement stipulate the possibility to reimburse costs of natural persons engaged into direct implementation of election campaigning events. In particular, the reimbursements could include expenses for telephone services, cost of travel (including baggage transportation), catering, accommodation, and other costs in case of implementing election campaigning events in another settlement, etc.

Therefore, CEC admits only for concluding unsalaried contracts between a voter and a candidate, while financial reimbursements to citizens engaged into election campaigning were recognized as legal.

Usually, the massive expenses of candidates for involving citizens into campaigning are outside the state's control. Current law does not allow remuneration of labour of natural persons who do the campaigning, while the ban intends to prevent vote-buying. In our opinion, on the eve of 2019 parliamentary election the state needs to find a balance in the law between the necessity to legalize the actual expenditures of candidates on professional staffing support of campaigning and the guarantee of efficient mechanisms to counteract vote-buying.

In OPORA's view, the Explanatory Statement adopted by the CEC on the ban to give money to voters, or goods, services, works, securities, loans, lotteries, either free of charge or on preferential terms, is within the competence of the Commission (part seven, Art. 64 of the Law of Ukraine "On Election of the President of Ukraine").

However, the model suggested by the CEC to regulate the process of the candidates' engaging citizens into campaigning does not have any efficient mechanisms of control over activities of legal entities who are contractors of managers of the candidate's election fund. This shortcoming of the Explanatory Statement is related, among other things, to the lack of legislative regulation of reporting of legal entities that would provide services for the candidate to reimburse costs of citizens incurred due to campaigning. In these settings, according to OPORA, there are severe risks to make fictitious reimbursements to voters in order to influence the outcome of voting.

At the moment of publishing the report, judicial proceedings on legitimacy of the Explanatory Statement of the CEC are still underway. They were initiated by representatives of Ukrainian presidential candidates **Anatoliy Hrytsenko and Vitaliy Kupriy**. The sixth administrative court of appeals as the first instance court ruled the opposite decisions on the Explanatory Statement that are currently contested on the level of the Supreme Court of Ukraine.

During the reporting period, it was recorded a number of cases of dissemination of information on organization of vote-buying that were provocative in nature and proved to be false. In Volyn oblast, for example, a citizen was brought to administrative liability for untruthful report to police on vote-buying. Under the court decision, the fine for the offender was UAH 51.

In Kolomyia of Ivano-Frankivsk oblast, in social media, an announcement was posted offering illegitimate benefit for voting in favour of the Ukrainian presidential candidate **Yuliya Tymoshenko**. The deliberately provocative announcement stated the telephone number of one of the heads of local organization of "Batkivshchyna" Union who forwarded all the calls he received to the local organization of the Block of Petro Poroshenko "Solidarity".

Incidents and cases with signs of misuse of administrative resources during the election

Over the reporting period, the election campaign was taking place on conditions of start or more intense implementation of social welfare programs for citizens on national and local levels. A number of Ukrainian presidential candidates and their political teams have a practical opportunity to engage civil servants into campaigning. Information resources of local executive authorities and local self-government bodies cover election campaigns of candidates which goes against the democratic election standards. It highlights the need to counteract misuse of budget resources in favour of certain candidates or the use of budget supported initiatives for electoral benefits. Observers identified specific cases of engaging employees of institutions and organizations into holding of campaigning events. The

recorded practices prove the need of more efficient prevention and counteraction of misuse of administrative resources.

In February 2019 poky OPORA observers recorded a number of cases and events with signs of misuse of administrative resources for election purposes. According to findings of Venice commission (“For Democracy Through Law”) and of OECD/ODIHR, misuse of administrative resources in the electoral process is a key challenge for competitiveness of electoral process and exercise of principle of equal opportunity of candidates. According to the terminology of OECD/ODIHR, misuse of administrative resources is a situation when some parties or candidates have uncompetitive advantages to impact the voting results by abusing their official positions or relations with the government.

According to OPORA findings, certain Ukrainian presidential candidates have a practical possibility to misuse administrative resources in favour of their personal election interests (Oleksandr Vilkul, Ruslan Koshulynskyi, Petro Poroshenko, Yuliya Tymoshenko). Of them, the most intense activities in this context are those of the current President of Ukraine, a self-nominated candidate Petro Poroshenko.

In the context of official election campaign, it is still difficult to separate the activities related to official position and campaigning activities of **Petro Poroshenko**. For example, in February, the President of Ukraine held 7 meetings of local Councils of Regional Development in his official status (Odesa, Kirovohrad, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Lviv, Mykolayiv oblasts).

On the national level, the Council of Regional Development is an advisory body under the President of Ukraine, while local state administrations issued directives and established the councils of respective levels. The fact of having the Head of State as a chairperson at meetings of local councils of regional development was actively used to communicate electoral programme principles of this Ukrainian presidential candidate and declaration of the de facto electoral promises.

OPORA observers state the need to have a more clear distinction between the official and campaigning activities of Petro Poroshenko, in order to make it impossible to use official events of authorities for electoral benefits. In particular, a positive practice shall be to avoid direct or indirect evaluations of other Ukrainian presidential candidates, mentions of facts about this person of running for electoral process. Under the Law of Ukraine “On Election of the President of Ukraine,” Ukrainian presidential candidates who hold official positions are prohibited to use their operational or official meetings for the benefits of campaigning (part 15 of Article 63). Instead, executive authorities and local self-government authorities are prohibited to participate in campaigning during their work hours which requires efficient efforts to prevent cases of misusing official events of authorities for the benefits of certain candidates.

On the local level, there are activities held to enforce the Presidential Decree “On Additional Measures to Provide for Decentralization Reform of Authorities” signed by the Head of State on December, 06, 2018. The Decree specifies, among other things, that local state administrations and local self-government bodies shall draft the plans for advanced development of their respective regions, cities, villages, and townships. Over the reporting period, OPORA observers have recorded a number of cases of using the events of public discussions of the advanced development plans for campaigning in favour of the Ukrainian presidential candidate Petro Poroshenko. For example, in February, during the discussion of advanced development plans in communities in Lviv oblast, direct calls to vote for Petro Poroshenko were identified and/or indirect campaigning in his favour made by people’s deputies of Ukraine and by heads of district state administrations.

The forthcoming presidential election in Ukraine coincided with the start of implementation of public activities to indexation of pensions and monetization of subsidies for utilities for citizens. The first stage of payments of the re-calculated pensions and monetized housing subsidies shall start on March, 04, and finish on March, 25. According to public statements of the Pension Fund and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, in March about 1,900 mln. of pensioners will receive supplements to their retirement payments, in the amount of UAH 2,410, in line with indexation of the respective payments. In total, the expected indexation of pensions will cover about 10 mln. citizens (according to statements of Andriy Reva, Minister of Social policy). On the other hand, starting from March this year, about UAH 6 bln. of housing subsidies will be paid to citizens in cash in the framework of government experiment.

Despite the fact that the activities have been planned before the official start of election campaign, it is important that public officials and civil servants of local self-government safeguard a real politically neutral attitudes when interacting with citizens in the context of making the payments. According to the joint recommendations of the Venice commission and the Council for Democratic Election on prevention of misuse of budget administrative resources (2016), regular operations of the government shall continue throughout the election period. However, in order to prevent any violations of the principle of equal opportunity of candidates and parties, during the campaign there shall not be any important statements aimed at shaping favourable perception of a certain party or a candidate.

In this respect, one cannot ignore personal engagement of the President of Ukraine, and a presidential candidate Petro Poroshenko in the governmental meeting on indexation of pensions on February, 25, 2019. At the same time, the process of making pension payments and of monetization is rather actively used by Petro Poroshenko in his information campaign in his support, including subject-related statements during his regional visits.

Thorough compliance with the principle of separation of powers between the authorities in the implementation of budget programs is a means to prevent misuse of administrative resources during elections. The issues of pension benefits and management of social welfare payments are within the competence of the Government of Ukraine. With account for the need to avoid practices of misuse of administrative resources, a unique role in informing citizens on the process of making social payments shall belong to the Pension Fund of Ukraine and to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

During the reporting period, there was recorded the launch of new social programs and raising payments to some groups of citizens. The initiatives refer both to national and local levels.

In February the President of Ukraine declared about his assignment to raise the level of pay services to military service members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine who serve on the first and second lines of defense on the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts affected by the armed aggression from the Russian Federation. According to this announcement, additional payments on the first line of defense will be two thousand hryvnas from April, 01, while on the second line of defense, the additional payments will amount to one thousand hryvnas.

After the public statement of the President of Ukraine, the Minister of Defense of Ukraine signed an order on raising additional payments to the pay services to the Ukrainian Armed Forces service members who stay within the area of Joint Forces Operation, or are on a mission offshore the Sea of Azov.

On the regional level, some authorities started or intensified the programs of targeted support to citizens. One of the most indicative cases is a complex social program "Care" of Mykolayiv Regional Council adopted on December, 21, 2018. The program provides for allocation of UAH 10 mln. for the targeted monetary support to citizens. It must be mentioned that Mykolayiv regional council has not before provided for funding of similar programs of targeted support to citizens. According to the decision of Odesa regional council, the amount of funding of the complex program of social support to citizens has grown significantly, from UAH 87.146 mln. to UAH 190.444 mln. At the same time, of UAH 103.3 mln. added to the program, about UAH 90 mln. are sent to provide for one-time financial aid. According to OPORA observers, the new area of the regional program does not have any clear provisions on any specific categories of citizens entitled to receive the aid. The active stage of processing and paying the targeted aid within the social program of Odesa regional council has been launched this February.

Dnipro city council (Dnipropetrovsk oblast) simplified the procedures for citizens to receive financial aid in January, 2019, and significantly increased the volume of its budget funding. OPORA observers recorded calls of city council seniors to the employees of municipal companies and organizations to apply for filing the financial aid. Because of massive submission of applications for financial aid, and of long queues of citizens, on February, 11, Dnipro city council held a regular session with only one issue on the agenda, on canceling the previous decision on simplification of the procedure to file for the aid. At the same time, the total amount of funding for the targeted aid stayed the same.

In its recommendations to prevent misuse of budget administrative resources, the Venice Commission stated that that the electoral process is not a proper time to create new programs or actions related to

budget funds and not planned before the start of campaign. Such programs and actions, according to the Venice commission, can be easily qualified as misuse of budget administrative resources.

The peculiarities of initiatives to raise budget payments during the election include their high legitimacy among target groups entitled for the payments, on the one hand, and the possibly non-competitive influence on the course of the campaign. In this context, it is important for candidates to account for direct restrictions in the law, and also to comply with the principles of political neutrality of the system of public administration and budget relations.

OPORA recorded a number of cases with signs of breaking the standards of political neutrality of officials during elections, and failure to comply with limitations on their participation in election campaign. For example, head of Rozdilna district council (Odesa oblast) Feliks Sihal, when conducting several meetings with school headmasters, the staff of local education boards, and representatives of parent committees informed participants of the official event about his intention to vote for the Ukrainian presidential candidate **Oleksandr Vilkul**. In this region, some civil servants of local authorities used their normal working hours to attend the event of public signing of the memorandum in support of the Ukrainian presidential candidate **Petro Poroshenko** (Kodyma DSA, and officials of other authorities). Under par. 2, part 1. Art. 64 of the Law of Ukraine "On Election of the President of Ukraine," officials and civil servants of authorities are forbidden to participate in the electoral campaigning during their normal working hours. In Brody, Lviv region, head of administration of regional state administration Marianna Vilshynska stated that the winner in the Ukrainian presidential election will be either Petro Poroshenko, or Volodymyr Putin. Officials of certain local self-government bodies express their public support to the candidates **Ruslan Koshulynskyi, Yuliya Tymoshenko, and Oleh Liashko**.

It must be stated that these are only individual cases of a rather massive participation of officials of local authorities in direct or concealed campaigning in favour of Ukrainian presidential candidates. High level of engagement of heads of RSAs and DSAs in the election campaigns was enhanced by the removal of heads of local state administrations from the category of civil servants in 2017. Instead, this circumstance has not canceled the restrictions of election law on participation of authorities, their officials and servants in electoral campaigning.

OPORA observers note the massive nature of practices of communicating the electoral campaigning activities of the Ukrainian presidential candidate **Petro Poroshenko** on official web-sites of RSAs and DSAs. A large part of the cases have signs of breaking part 3 of Art. 58 of the Law of Ukraine "On Election of the President of Ukraine". According to the Law, official statements on activities of candidates who hold official positions during the election process shall not be followed by comments that have signs of electoral campaigning. At the same time, observers state that in some regions, DSAs stopped the practices of posting campaigning comments on their own web-sites, after public statements of OPORA (Mykolayiv oblast).

During the reporting period, OPORA observers identified facts of engaging employees of municipal companies into campaigning activities in favour of Ukrainian presidential candidates. For example, in the town of Kamyanske, Dnipropetrovsk oblast, there have been facts on the centralized engagement of employees of municipal companies into campaigning activities in support of Ukrainian presidential candidates **Yuliya Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko**.

Material Incentives for Voters

Campaigning by Means of Providing Free of Charge Goods and Services to Voters

OPORA observers recorded rather massive cases of charitable events held by local organizations of political parties and by deputies of local councils, or cases of providing goods and services to citizens. A distinct area of political charity was having local politicians implement projects of infrastructural aid to budget organizations and institutions. According to OPORA estimates, the most active approach in organizing charitable activities was undertaken by local organizations of the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, "Batkivshchyna" Union, "Opposition Bloc", "Petro Poroshenko Bloc "Solidarity", "Svoboda" AUU, "Samopomich" Union. For example, at the municipal non-profit company "City Center of Primary Health Care" of Energodar city council, a free of charge medial examination is conducted as initiated by the local deputy from the "Samopomich" Union.

These activities are usually not directly related to activities of Ukrainian presidential candidates. However, such events do have a direct impact on the course of presidential campaign, in terms of party affiliation of local political leaders. Another factor in the forthcoming presidential election in Ukraine is the activities of people's deputies of Ukraine who unfolded public activities in electoral districts in order to prepare for the parliamentary campaign.

OPORA calls on local organizations of political parties and on Ukrainian presidential candidates to avoid politically motivated charitable activities during elections. It will promote the entire situation with keeping with the election law. This calling also refers to cases when charitable activities did not formally break the law and could not be considered as vote-buying, in legal terms, but de facto, they are aimed at offering material incentives to voters.

Breaking Restrictions on Campaigning

As compared to January, 2019, this month, recorded lower intensity of cases of dissemination of campaigning printed materials without any source data, however they were still rather widespread. Pursuant to the Law of Ukraine "On Election of the President of Ukraine," campaigning printed materials shall contain data on the printing institution, their circulation, information on persons in charge of the issue, and the commissioner of the materials. This legal requirement is a mechanism to control the expenses on campaigning and to prevent its funding from sources other than the election fund of the candidate. Instead, the law directly bans funding the costs for campaigning from sources other than election fund. OPORA observers actively interact with the local units of the National Police of Ukraine on taking record of such violations on the part of a wide range of Ukrainian presidential candidates and campaigning services providers.

The same as in January, 2019, OPORA observers pointed to the signs of concealed campaigning at the concerts of the production center "Liha Smikhu" founded by the presidential candidate Volodymyr Zelenskyi. During the concerts in the regions of Ukraine, they broadcast a video address of Volodymyr Zelenskyi that contains signs of campaigning. Under the current law of Ukraine, a Ukrainian presidential candidate has a right to support concerts which is a legal form of campaigning. Such campaigning activities must be funded from the candidate's election fund. In case of including campaigning into concerts of the "Liha Smikhu", Volodymyr Zelenskyi must fund them from the election fund, or avoid any signs of campaigning when holding these entertaining events. OPORA calls on the candidate to clearly distinguish his professional and political activities in line with the provisions of the law on funding campaigning from the election fund.

Dissemination of "Black PR" Against Ukrainian Presidential Candidates

OPORA observers recorded mass campaigning of negative image in printed media of the regions of Ukraine targeted against a Ukrainian presidential candidate **Volodymyr Zelenskyi**. Usually, the same stories against Volodymyr Zelenskyi were posted in different newspapers, while sources of funding for such anti-campaigning are not known to observers. Slightly less widespread, but still very active, was the "black PR" in the printed media against Anatoliy Hrytsenko, Yuliya Tymoshenko, and Petro Poroshenko.

Part 5 of Art. 64 of the Law of Ukraine "On Election of the President of Ukraine" bans the dissemination of deliberate false reports about Ukrainian presidential candidates. Election law of Ukraine secures to Ukrainian presidential candidates the right to contest the reports that the candidate deems deliberately false.

Illegal Countermeasures to Activities of Ukrainian Presidential Candidates

During the reporting period, almost in all regions of Ukraine, cases were recorded of deliberate damage of political advertisements of Ukrainian presidential candidates. According to OPORA's provisional estimates, most frequent cases of damaging the outdoor advertising referred to Ukrainian presidential candidates **Oleksandr Vilkul and Yevhen Murayev**. Other candidates were also affected, but on a smaller scale. In addition, there were cases of damaging campaigning materials in support of Ukrainian presidential candidates (related to candidates **Petro Poroshenko, Yuliya Tymoshenko**, and some others). Some cases had signs of forceful confrontation to outdoor campaigns in support of Ukrainian

presidential candidates or with their direct participation. For example, on February, 8, 2019, in the city of Bila Tserkva, during the speech of Yuliya Tymoshenko at the outdoor meeting, some unknown persons used four smoke grenades.

OPORA calls for attention of law-enforcement bodies and electoral subjects to the need to prevent armed confrontation between participants of election campaign. The possibility to freely run the election campaign is an integral standard of democratic elections.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Supreme Council of Ukraine:

- To provide for adoption of changes to the law in order to regulate practices of engaging citizens into campaigning in favour of Ukrainian presidential candidates. The changes shall simultaneously account for the relevance of legalization of justified costs incurred by the candidates and the need to prevent vote-buying.
- To facilitate the adoption of the draft law No.8270 on providing for irreversible nature of punishment for election fraud in order to enhance chances to counteract the fraud during elections.
- To facilitate the approval of the draft law of Ukraine on providing for voting rights of internally displaced persons and other internally mobile citizens.

To the Central Election Commission of Ukraine:

- To enhance awareness raising among citizens on possibilities and procedures to change the voting place without changing the voting address.
- To enhance control over compliance of electoral subjects with the provisions of the law on funding the campaigns, such as the turnover of accounts of election funds of candidates.
- To consider the possibility to improve the Explanatory Statement of the CEC on vote-buying (part 6, Art. 64 of the Law of Ukraine "On Election of the President of Ukraine") engaging a wide circle of experts and NGOs.

To the Security Service of Ukraine:

- To provide additional evidence to support the statements on organization of vote-buying by a group of persons led by people's deputies of Ukraine for the benefits of a Ukrainian presidential candidate.
- To provide for due coordination with the National Police of Ukraine in order to efficiently investigate facts of breaching the law by electoral subjects.

To the National Police of Ukraine:

- To continue with the activities and programs of raising the overall competence of law-enforcement officers in identifying, recording, and responding to election fraud.
- To provide for due coordination with the Security Service of Ukraine and the General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine, in order to provide for efficient investigation of the declared facts of breaking the law by electoral subjects.
- To enhance preventive measures against violence and damage of campaigning materials/property of Ukrainian presidential candidates.

APPENDIXES

Distribution of candidates by the number of obtained positions in the DEC's

Candidate	Number of members in DEC's	Number of senior positions	Share of senior positions of the persons delegated by the candidate	Share of senior positions of a candidate of the total number of all senior positions in DEC's
Hennadiy Balashov	19	2	10.5%	0.3%
Roman Bezsmertnyi	159	13	8.2%	2.2%
Olha Bohomolets	195	16	8.2%	2.7%
Inna Bohoslovska	89	7	7.9%	1.2%
Yuriy Boyko	199	16	8.0%	2.7%
Viktor Bondar	197	16	8.1%	2.7%
Oleksandr Vashchenko	87	7	8.0%	1.2%
Oleksandr Vilkul	199	16	8.0%	2.7%
Mykola Haber	199	16	8.0%	2.7%
Dmytro Hnap	11	1	9.1%	0.2%
Anatolii Hrytsenko	199	16	8.0%	2.7%
Oleksandr Danyliuk	197	16	8.1%	2.7%
Yuriy Derevyanko	197	16	8.1%	2.7%
Dmytro Dobrodomov	14	1	7.1%	0.2%
Vasyl Zhuravlov	199	16	8.0%	2.7%

Volodymyr Zelenskyi	199	16	8.0%	2.7%
Serhiy Kaplin	198	16	8.1%	2.7%
Yuriy Karmazin	128	11	8.6%	1.8%
Illya Kyva	101	8	7.9%	1.3%
Ruslan Koshulynskyi	199	16	8.0%	2.7%
Viktor Kryvenko	198	16	8.1%	2.7%
Serhiy Kryvonos	92	8	8.7%	1.3%
Vitaliy Kupriy	196	16	8.2%	2.7%
Yuliya Lytvynenko	199	16	8.0%	2.7%
Oleh Liashko	199	16	8.0%	2.7%
Oleksandr Moroz	198	16	8.1%	2.7%
Yevheniy Murayev	150	12	8.0%	2.0%
Valentyn Nalyvaychenko	199	16	8.0%	2.7%
Roman Nasirov	197	16	8.1%	2.7%
Andriy Novak	199	16	8.0%	2.7%
Serhiy Nosenko	198	16	8.1%	2.7%
Volodymyr Petrov	199	16	8.0%	2.7%
Petro Poroshenko	199	16	8.0%	2.7%
Ruslan Ryhovanov	199	16	8.0%	2.7%
Andriy Sadovyi	196	16	8.2%	2.7%
Vitaliy Skotsyk	193	16	8.3%	2.7%
Ihor Smeshko	180	15	8.3%	2.5%

Oleksandr Solovyov	198	16	8.1%	2.7%
Serhiy Taruta	199	16	8.0%	2.7%
Yuriy Tymoshenko	194	16	8.2%	2.7%
Yuliya Tymoshenko	199	16	8.0%	2.7%
Ihor Shevchenko	190	16	8.4%	2.7%
Oleksandr Shevchenko	199	16	8.0%	2.7%

Coverage of area and representation of candidates in district election commissions

Candidate	Number of regions where candidates obtained representation among members of DEC's
Hennadiy Balashov	2
Roman Bezsmertnyi	23
Olha Bohomolets	25
Inna Bohoslovka	18
Yuriy Boyko	25
Viktor Bondar	25
Oleksandr Vashchenko	16
Oleksandr Vilkul	25
Mykola Haber	25
Dmytro Hnap	6
Anatolii Hrytsenko	25
Oleksandr Danyliuk	25
Yuriy Derevyanko	25
Dmytro Dobrodomov	3
Vasyl Zhuravlov	25

Volodymyr Zelenskyi	25
Serhiy Kaplin	25
Yuriy Karmazin	25
Illya Kyva	12
Arkadiy Kornatskyi	0
Ruslan Koshulynskyi	25
Viktor Kryvenko	25
Serhiy Kryvonos	21
Vitaliy Kupriy	25
Yuliya Lytvynenko	25
Oleh Liashko	25
Oleksandr Moroz	25
Yevheniy Murayev	18
Valentyn Nalyvaychenko	25
Roman Nasirov	25
Andriy Novak	25
Serhiy Nosenko	25
Volodymyr Petrov	25
Petro Poroshenko	25
Ruslan Ryhovanov	25
Andriy Sadovyi	25
Vitaliy Skotsyk	25
Ihor Smeshko	23
Oleksandr Solovyov	25
Serhiy Taruta	25
Yuriy Tymoshenko	25

Yuliya Tymoshenko	25
Ihor Shevchenko	25
Oleksandr Shevchenko	25

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