

Promo - LEX

Promovarea democrației și a drepturilor omului

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pentru alegeri libere și corecte

REPORT no. 7

**Observation Mission
General Local Elections and New Parliamentary Elections
of 20 October (3 November) 2019**

ELECTION DAY

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Chisinau 2019

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The report has been drafted as part of the Mission observing the general local and parliamentary elections of October 20, 2019, carried out by the Promo-LEX Association with the financial support of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) through the “Democracy, Transparency and Responsibility” Program.

The responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report lies with the Promo-LEX Association and does not necessarily reflect the position of the donors.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Opening and closing of polling stations (PSs). All polling stations monitored by the short-term observers of the Promo-LEX OM opened regularly, without any essential deviations from the applicable legal provisions. About 60 % of the PSs have been rated by observers as accessible. Only 58% of the PSs have been ensured with heating on the election day. All the polling stations closed regularly, without significant deviations. About 27% of the PEBs continued to ignore the rule that stipulates that one member of the bureau is to display the ballots to all the participants in the counting process.

Incidents found on the election day. The final processing of the information reported by the STOs delegated to the PSs and the LTOs working in mobile teams resulted in the analysis of 158 incidents.

The Promo-LEX OM draws the reader's attention to at least two cases of intimidation/obstruction of observers' activity. In quantitative terms, the most frequently reported incidents were: unjustified presence of unauthorized persons within 100 m. of the PS as well as in the PS (25); presence of advertising materials, posters, electoral displays within 100 m. of the PS (21); and difficulties for the operation of the SIAS Elections system (20).

The Promo-LEX OM also warns about incidents related to: organized transportation of voters (13) and rumors, attempts or even cases of material or monetary rewards offered to voters (8).

Final results of the Promo-LEX OM vote counting. The Promo-LEX OM analyzed the correctness of completing 307 vote counting protocols in mayoral elections in the 307 PSs observed in Chisinau municipality. The OM identified 6 protocols filled out with 14 errors identified based on verification formulas.

The results of parallel vote counting for the post of general mayor of Chisinau municipality confirmed the percentage offered by the CEC.

INTRODUCTION

Report no. 7 has been developed within the framework of the Promo-LEX Observation Mission (OM) of the general local and parliamentary elections of October 20 (November 3), 2019 and includes the main findings and trends in the incidents reported on the Election Day for the second round of elections, as well as the analysis of the parallel vote counting made by the Promo-LEX OM.

The second round for the election of mayors within 384 districts has been carried out on November 3, 2019.

The report has been prepared based on the findings reported by short-term observers (STOs) delegated to 307 polling stations set up in the electoral constituency of Chisinau. Additionally, the processes held on the day of the second round of elections were observed by 39 mobile teams of the Promo-LEX OM set up both in Chisinau municipality and one in each of the second level ATUs where mayoral elections took place on November 3, 2019.

All the observers involved in the monitoring process are trained in the seminars organized by the Promo-LEX Mission and sign the Code of Conduct¹ of the Promo-LEX Independent National Observatory, committing to act in good faith and in a non-partisan way. The activity of all observers is coordinated by the central team of the Mission.

The report is drawn up based on the findings of the STOs reported on the basis of two thematic formulations: a periodic reporting form and an incident reporting form. Additionally, the Promo-LEX OM checked, within the limits of the available human resources, the alerts received from different categories of citizens regarding the alleged violations on the day of the second round of elections.

The Promo-LEX OM for the general local elections and the new parliamentary elections of October 20 (November 3) 2019 is a project carried out by the Promo-LEX Association within the Civic Coalition for Free and Fair Elections. The Promo-LEX OM is not a political opponent of the competitors involved in the electoral process, it is not an investigative body and does not assume the express obligation to prove the observed findings. However, observers' reports are accompanied, as far as possible, by photographic and video evidence, which can only be made available to law enforcement bodies, on the basis of appropriate requests, and in no case, shall it be provided to electoral competitors. At the same time, the violations, including the alleged ones, which are found in this report, must be treated by the electoral authorities in the light of the provisions of art. 22, para. (1), letter q) and art. 68, para. (5) Electoral Code, including as notifications filed by observers and be examined by the competent authorities.

The international standards referred to in this report are those developed by the UN, OSCE, the European Commission for Democracy through Law, the European Union and the Council of Europe. At the end of this report, we formulated preliminary recommendations for public authorities, electoral bodies, electoral candidates / participants in the referendums and other stakeholders to ensure the optimization of the electoral process.

The report is prepared as part of the Observation Mission for the general local and new parliamentary elections of October 20 (November 3), 2019 carried out by the Promo-LEX Association with the financial support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through the "Democracy, Transparency and Accountability" Program. The opinions expressed in the public reports and press releases of the Promo-LEX MO belong to the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the financiers or partners. The content of this document may be subject to editorial review.

¹ <https://promolex.md/4689-codul-de-conduita-al-observatorilor-electorali-promo-lex/>

I. OPENING AND CLOSING OF POLLING STATIONS

All polling stations monitored by the short-term observers of the Promo-LEX OM opened regularly, without any essential deviations from the applicable legal provisions. About 60 % of the PSs have been rated by observers as accessible. Only 58% of the PSs have been ensured with heating on the election day. All the polling stations closed regularly, without significant deviations. About 27% of the PEBs continued to ignore the rule that stipulates that one member of the bureau is to display the ballots to all the participants in the counting process.

1.1. The opening of the PSs

The short-term observers of the Promo-LEX OM monitored the second round of elections in 307 PS set up in the electoral constituency of Chisinau. Accordingly, the data on the opening and closing of the PSs, as well as certain particularities of the conduct of the voting procedures are summarized based on the information transmitted by 307 STOs.

The polling stations in the electoral constituency of Chisinau, in general, opened regularly, the time deviations reported therein being insignificant in duration.

Table no. 1. Opening of polling stations (based on 307 PSs)

Period	Between 6:50 - 6:59	At 7:00	Between 7:01 - 7:14
Number of PSs opened	24 (8%)	277 (90%)	6 (2%)

1.2. Accessibility of PSs

Table no. 2. Accessibility features of polling stations (based on 307 PSs)

Category	YES	NO
Is the polling station accessible to people with locomotor difficulties?	183 (60%)	124 (40%)
Is the polling station ensured with heating?	177 (58%)	130 (42%)
Is the polling station illuminated enough to carry out electoral procedures?	303 (99%)	4 (1%)

1.3. The closure of PSs

Table no. 3. Procedures for closing the PS and counting of votes (based on 307 PSs)

Category	YES	NO
Did the polling station close at 9 pm?	306 (99.7%)	1 ² (0.3%)
Were special forms for vote counting results initially drafted?	305 (99.4%)	2 (0.6%)
Did only one PEB member show the ballots to all participants in the vote counting process?	226 (73%)	205 (27%)
Did the video camera record the entire process of unsealing the ballot boxes and counting the ballots, without interruptions?	304 (99.4%)	3 (0.6%)

² The delays were insignificant.

II. INCIDENTS FOUND ON ELECTION DAY

The final processing of the information reported by the STOs delegated to the PSs and the LTOs working in mobile teams resulted in the analysis of 158 incidents.

The Promo-LEX OM draws the reader's attention to at least two cases of intimidation/obstruction of observers' activity. In quantitative terms, the most frequently reported incidents were: unjustified presence of unauthorized persons within 100 m. of the PS as well as in the PS (25); presence of advertising materials, posters, electoral displays within 100 m. of the PS (21); and difficulties for the operation of the SIAS Elections system (20).

The Promo-LEX OM also warns about incidents related to: organized transportation of voters (13) and rumors, attempts or even cases of material or monetary rewards offered to voters (8).

2.1. Intimidated/ obstructed activity of Promo-LEX observers

According to art. 68 para. (5) of the Electoral Code, observers accredited by the CEC may monitor the electoral process throughout the country and in all polling stations, while observers accredited by the DEC – may do it only within the respective constituency. Accredited observers have the right to attend all the electoral operations, all the meetings of electoral bodies, including on the day of elections, without intervening in the electoral process or in other electoral operations and to inform the president of electoral body about the irregularities observed.

According to the reports presented by the Promo-LEX observers, there were at least **2 cases**, in which observers' activity in the polling stations was intimidated or obstructed.

Intimidation of Promo-LEX observers	
1 case	PSs 13/13 and 13/14. Suspicions that the mobile team has been chased by unidentified individuals.
Obstruction of the free observation process	
1 case	PS 12/15. Placing the observers in a way so as to give them low visibility on the voting process.

2.2. Ballot boxes were not secured in compliance with the legal procedures / broken / damaged or complete absence of seals on ballot boxes

According to art. 60 para. (1) of the Electoral Code, on the election day, at 07.00, the president of PEB, in the presence of at least half of the members of the bureau, shall check the ballot boxes and seal them. According to points 26 and 27 of the CEC Instruction on ensuring of the PS infrastructure, ballot boxes shall be secured by sealing. The stationary ballot boxes are secured by means of 4 self-locking collar type seals, and the mobile ballot boxes, by means of 1 (one) seal.

The observers of the Promo-LEX OM identified **18 cases** of non-observance of legal procedures for securing ballot boxes, namely:

Ballot boxes were not secured in compliance with the legal procedures		
DEC	No. of cases	PSs
1 Chisinau	10	6, 14, 17, 24, 91, 194, 229, 230, 253, 290.
4 Anenii Noi	4	3, 10, 22, 40.
11 Cimislia	1	24.
14 Drochia	1	13.
23 Nisporeni	1	3.
31 Soldanesti	1	20.

2.3. Presence of advertising materials, posters, electoral displays within the precinct (100 m from the PS)

According to art. 60 para. (7) of the Electoral Code, "On the election day, the responsibility for ensuring public order in the polling station and in the surrounding territory, within 100 meters from the polling station, is carried out by the president of the precinct electoral bureau". Decisions made in this respect are enforceable for all.

Promo-LEX OM considers that the Regulation on the placement of electoral advertising and political promotion materials must be adjusted to the new provisions of the Electoral Code and return to the version that was in force before the parliamentary elections of February 24, 2019 when there were normative provisions expressly banning electoral displays within 100 m from the polling station.

Promo-LEX observers have identified at least **21 PSs³**, with advertising materials, posters, electoral displays within 100 m from the PS.

Presence of advertising materials, posters, electoral displays in the precinct (within 100 m of the PS)		
Electoral Competitor	No. of cases	Polling Stations
PSRM	7	1/247; 1/248; 1/249; 4/2; 24/6; 30/30; 32/8
PDM	3	14/14; 26/16; 30/30
ACUM Bloc	8	1/136; 1/262; 1/270; 1/287; 1/303; 10/15; 32/27; 34/26
PPS	1	25/55 (10 materials)
PN	1	13/1
PPEM	1	1/264

2.4. Unjustified presence of unauthorized persons in the PS and within 100 m of the PS

According to art. 60 para. (8) of the Electoral Code, the activity of electoral bodies may be attended by: members / representatives of hierarchically superior electoral bodies; representatives of electoral competitors in electoral bodies; national / international observers accredited by the respective bodies, as well as their interpreters, as the case may be; representatives of mass media.

Promo-LEX observers found at least **25 cases**, where certain categories of unauthorized persons spent in the PSs a period of time greater than the limit allowed by the legal provisions.

Unjustified presence of unauthorized persons in the precinct of the polling station	
Number of cases	Polling Stations
9 cases	Involving electoral competitors: PSRM (4): PS 14/9; PS 16/39; PS 34/44; PS 1/278; ACUM (5): PS 23/31; PS 31/29; PS 32/25; PS 34/26; PS 34/30;
16 cases	Unjustified presence of some unidentified persons. PS 28/27; PS 5/2; PS 7/41; PS 32/27; PS 11/38; PS 24/ 6 (2); PS 1 /265; PS 13/13; PS 22/12 PS 1/273; PS 16/ 34; PS 1/67; PS 1/282; PS 1/299; PS 1/77.

³ A polling station had advertising materials placed within 100 m of the PS in favor of two electoral competitors

2.5. Rumors, attempts or even cases of material or monetary rewards offered to voters

According to art. 41 para. (5) - (6) of the Electoral Code, electoral competitors are forbidden to offer voters money, distribute free material goods, including humanitarian aid, or carry out any other charitable actions, with the exception of offering symbolic gifts that represent electoral or political advertising and bear the symbol of the electoral competitor, whose market value does not exceed 2 conventional units, being paid from the "Electoral Fund" account.

Promo-LEX observers have identified **8 cases** of offering of material or monetary rewards to voters.

Rumors, attempts or even cases of material or monetary rewards offered to voters in the polling station and/or near it	
Number of cases	Description
8 cases	Involving the PDM representatives (4 cases): Foodstuffs and alcoholic drinks rewards: PS 9/41; PS 30/26 (2); Money rewards: PS 23/27 (250 lei).
	Involving the PSRM representatives (1 case) Reward including transportation service to the registration office in order to get temporary ID Card: PS 28/54.
	Involving ACUM Bloc DA and PAS (1 case) Money rewards: PS 23/27 (250 lei).
	Involving unidentified electoral competitors (2 cases): Alcoholic drinks rewards: PS 9/12 Money rewards (1 case): PS 1/ 282.

2.6. Electoral campaigning on the election day

According to the Electoral Code, art. 52 para. (10) no electoral campaigning is allowed on the election day and on the day preceding it. This prohibition does not refer to information already posted on the Internet and to posters previously displayed.

Promo-LEX observers have reported **6 cases** that can be qualified as acts of electoral campaigning to influence the voter's choice. Thus, the OM identified 3 cases of campaigning in favor of the PSRM candidates, the ACUM Bloc, the IC Nicolae Balaur - one case each. In addition, there was a case of electoral campaigning in favor of a candidate, who could not be identified.

Electoral campaigning to influence the voter's choice		
In favor of	Polling Stations	Number of cases
PSRM	PS 1/ 154; PS 1/ 222; PS 9/15;	3
ACUM Bloc	PS 18/58	1
Independent candidates	Nicolae Balaur (Stauceni) PS 1/299	1
Unidentified candidates	PS 1/194	1

2.7. Organized transportation of voters (coaches, minibuses or other means of transportation that normally would not be around the PS)

Despite the fact that organized transportation of voters is not foreseen as a violation of the Electoral Code, the Promo-LEX OM has monitored these situations, considering them actions with the potential to bribe voters and influence the voting results.

Promo-LEX observers identified at least **13 cases**, where there were situations that can be interpreted as organized transportation of voters.

Organized transportation of voters (coaches, minibuses or other means of transportation that normally would not be around the PS)			
DEC	Number of cases	PS No.	Means of transportation involved
1 Chisinau	1	208.	VW black car, AI 290 (at least 3 trips carrying 4-5 voters);
5 Basarabasca	2	2.	Various cars (at least 2 trips)
11 Cimisia	2	4, 5.	Various cars.
16 Edinet	1	34.	Renault Laguna car model.
22 Leova	1	33.	1 car.
25 Orhei	1	55.	2 minibuses.

2.8. Unjustified termination / suspension of voting in the polling station

Art. 56 para. (1) of the Electoral Code stipulates that in the time reserved for voting, it is forbidden to close the polling station and to suspend the voting, except for cases of mass disorder, natural disasters, other unforeseen circumstances, which put voters in danger or make the voting impossible.

Promo-LEX MO observers identified **1 PS**, in which the voting process was unreasonably suspended for short periods of time.

Unjustified suspension of voting	
Number of PSs	Description
1 PS	Due to the lack of internet connection: PS 1/262 (Chisinau, Ciocana).

2.9. Deficiencies in the operation of SIAS Elections system

Point 61 of the Regulation on the activity of the PEB establishes that a member of the bureau shall hand a ballot to the voter, only after the voter has been verified by the SIAS Elections system operator and it has been found that the voter meets all the conditions for the voter's participation in the respective polling station.

Promo-LEX observers found **20 problematic situations**, where SIAS Elections system had either technical (cessation of operation, loss of Internet connection), or content deficiencies (inconsistencies between the data in voter's identity documents with those specified in the SIAS Elections system).

Deficiencies in the operation of SIAS Elections system	
Technical deficiencies including loss of internet connection (16 cases)	PS 18/67; 34/1; 1/283; 1/27; 1/154; 1/135; 1/96; 1/162; 16/25; 1/162; 16/34; 27/6; 27/46; 27/33; 1/31; 32/5.
Content deficiencies (2 cases)	PS 1/135; SV 1/169.
The activity of a single operator (2 cases)	PS 18/34; SV 18/20.

2.10. Deficiencies in the voters' lists

Voters' lists, drawn up on the basis of the State Registry of Voters, are lists comprising all voting citizens who have their domicile or residence within the territory of a polling station. The voter can only be registered in a single voters' list and in a single polling station.

Altogether, there were reported at least **8 problematic situations**, as follows:

Deficiencies in the voters' lists		
<i>Non-inclusion on the main voters' lists (5)</i>	<i>Errors in address / personal data / others (2 cases)</i>	<i>Foreign persons registered at voter's home address (1 case)</i>
PS 1/19; 1/262; 31/28; 1/152; 1/280.	PS 1/213; 1/8.	PS 1/57.

2.11. Interruption of the filming process during the preparation of the PS for opening, vote counting and other incidents

According to point 11 of the Regulation on the operation of the Video Recording System in the PS, the video recording system shall be functional and active only on the day of voting to monitor electoral operations during the opening of the polling station, closing of the polling station, the procedures of counting and totalizing the votes.

According to the reports presented by Promo-LEX observers, there were **7 cases** with incidents related to the shooting of voting procedures.

Interruption of the filming process during the preparation of the PS for opening, vote counting and other incidents	
<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>Polling Stations</i>
2	The process of vote counting was not fully / partially videorecorded: PS 1/71; PS 1/228.
3	Video camera did not function during the opening of the PS: PS 1/133; PS 34/1; PS 1/23.
2	Operation of video recording camera during the voting process PS 5/11; 33/21.

2.12. Photographing of ballot papers, other violations of the secrecy of voting

According to point 68 of the Regulation on the activity of the precinct electoral bureaus, it is forbidden to photograph the ballot that has been filled in. According to point 19 of the Instruction on ensuring the infrastructure of the PS, the booths for secret voting shall be placed in such a way that their uncovered part be oriented towards the remaining free wall of the PS, at a distance of no more than 1 m.

According to the reports presented by Promo-LEX observers, there were reported at least **9 cases** of photographing of ballot papers as well as breach of secrecy of voting, by incorrect positioning of the voting booth.

Photographing of ballot papers, other violations of the secrecy of voting	
<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>Polling Stations</i>
6 cases	PEB members tried to solve the incident when the voters photographed the ballots, in the following PS: 1/194, 1/302, 9/41, 1/296 (2), 1/312.
1 case	PEB members did not try to solve the incident when the voters photographed the ballots, in the following PS: 34/3.
1 case	In the following PSs, the positioning of voting booths did not provide for the secrecy of voting: 32/2.
1 case	For a period PEB members stayed behind the voting booth, this way failing to comply with the secrecy of voting: 1/7.

2.13. Acts of violence

Promo-LEX OM identified at least **2 cases** that can be qualified as acts of violence or intimidation of persons involved in the elections.

Intimidation of voters	
<i>Intimidation of PEB members – 1 case</i>	PS 5/2
<i>Sharp altercations between the supporters of the PS and ACUM Bloc candidates – 1 case</i>	Peresecina, Orhei district

2.14. Unjustified group voting (2 or more people in the voting booths)

*Art. 5 and 6 of the Electoral Code stipulate the universal principles underlying democratic elections, namely **the direct and secret voting**, i.e. the voter shall vote personally and secretly, thus excluding the possibility of influencing his or her will. Voting in place of another person is prohibited. The voter who is unable to fill in the ballot individually has the right to invite another person, except for PEB members, representatives of electoral competitors / participants in the referendum or persons authorized to attend the electoral operations.*

Promo-LEX observers reported at least **2 cases** that can be qualified as violation of direct and secret voting or unjustified group voting on the election day.

Unjustified group voting	
<i>PS in which PEB members got involved – 1 case</i>	PB 1/176
<i>PS in which PEB members did not react – 1 case</i>	PB 1/276

2.15. Deterioration of ballots or other incidents that refer to their non-conforming use

According to point 42 let. a) of the Regulation on the activity of precinct electoral bureau, during its activity, members of the electoral bureau shall maintain and ensure the integrity of ballot papers;

Promo-LEX OM observers reported **two cases** where ballots have been destroyed by being torn - **PS 1/108, PS 1/237**. In both cases, PEB members have reacted by alerting the police or drawing up the report in this respect.

2.16. Cancellation of ballots before the closure of polling stations

According to art. 61. para. (2) of the Electoral Code, before opening the ballot boxes for vote counting, PEB members shall count and cancel all the remaining unused ballot papers by applying the stamp "Canceled" on them.

Promo-LEX OM observers reported **1 case** that could be qualified as cancellation of ballots before the closure of the polling stations. The case refers to **PS 1/299**.

2.17. Disconnection of electricity

Promo-LEX OM observers reported **4 cases** of disconnection of polling stations from electricity. Cases refer to **PS 1/252, PS 1/253, PS 32/22, PS 32/23**.

2.18. Others

Among the **9 incidents** included in this category (see the complete list in Annex 1): *deficiencies related to the use of accompanying sheet of the ID (2 PSs); failure to comply with the procedures for ballots counting or cancelling (2 PSs), etc.*

III. FINAL RESULTS OF PROMO-LEX VOTE COUNTING

The Promo-LEX OM analyzed the correctness of completing 307 vote counting protocols in mayoral elections in the 307 PSs observed in Chisinau municipality. The OM identified 6 protocols filled out with 14 errors identified based on verification formulas.

The results of parallel vote counting in the elections for the post of general mayor of Chisinau municipality confirmed the percentage presented by the CEC.

3.1. Correctness of the preparation of protocols on vote counting results

Observing the second round of general local elections of October 20 (November 3), 2019, the Promo-LEX OM analyzed the correctness of completing 307 protocols on vote counting results in 307 PSs observed in Chisinau constituency. The Mission identified 6 protocols containing 14 errors, detected based on verification formulas (see Annex 2).

From a comparative perspective, the Promo-LEX OM points out that the share of erroneous protocols completed by the PEBs has decreased compared to the parliamentary elections of February 24, 2019. Types of errors are given in the Table 2 below.

Table 1. Dynamics of erroneous completion of protocols

Election Type	Number of protocols with errors (identified based on verification formulas)
Presidential Elections, 30.10.2016	31 (1.6%) ⁴
New Local Elections, 20.05.2018	22 (5.87%) ⁵ / 6 (2%) ⁶
Parliamentary Elections, 24.02.2019	142 (6.8%) ⁷ / 160 (7.6%) ⁸
General Local Elections, 20.10.2019	24 (3.2%) ⁹ / 6 (2%) ¹⁰

Table 2. Type and number of errors detected

ERROR TYPE	NUMBER
	Protocol for mayor's office
D = F+H	3
E = C-D	1
I = C+J	3
H = G1+G2+G3+G4+Gn	1
F = D-H	3
J = I-C	3

Correctness of the protocols was verified based on the formulas inserted in the text of the protocol: **d=f+h; e=c-d; i=c+j; h=g1+g2+g3+g4+...+gn; f=d-h; j=i-c.**

The formula **d=f+h** was not observed in 3 protocols. In these cases, they failed to show that the number of ballots taken from the ballot box coincides with the sum of invalid and valid ballots cast. Doubts may arise with regard to the correctness of counting of the votes validly cast, respectively of competitors' results.

⁴ The data are for the second round of voting, total number of processed protocols - 1981.

⁵ Round I of the new local elections of May 20, 2018, total number of processed protocols - 375.

⁶ Round II of the new local elections of May 20, 2018, total number of processed protocols - 306.

⁷ National Constituency

⁸ Uninominal Constituency

⁹ Round I of the general local elections of October 20, 2019, total number of processed protocols - 755.

¹⁰ Round II of the general local elections of October 20 (November 3), total number of processed protocols - 307.

The formula $e=c-d$ was not observed in a protocol. Thus, in this Protocol the number of signatures on voters' lists does not coincide with the number of ballots taken out of the ballot boxes.

The formula $i=c+j$ could not be applied correctly in the case of 3 protocols. The same situation is attested in the case of the formula $j=i-c$. Thus, PEB members incorrectly counted either the number of unused and canceled ballots or the number of signatures in the voters' lists. Moreover, we found that the expression "unused and canceled" may be misleading to PEB members, as it may be associated with two distinct categories of ballots.

The formula $h=g1+g2+g3+g4+...+gn$ was not observed in one case. We paid special attention to this formula: the separate sums of votes cast for competitors do not coincide with the total number of valid votes cast, which may provoke questions with regard to the correctness of the results for electoral competitors.

The formula $f=d-h$ verifies the number of ballots declared invalid by subtracting them from the total number of ballots validly cast. Errors in applying this verification formula are reported in 3 protocols.

3.2. Comparative analysis of the data on parallel vote counting carried out by the Promo-LEX OM and the preliminary data announced by the CEC

The final results, presented by the Promo-LEX OM, refer to the number of votes validly cast for the mayoral candidates in Chisinau municipality. The final results were calculated based on 307 protocols received by the observers.

Table 3. Results of parallel vote counting

Candidate's name	CEC, preliminary results	Promo-LEX, preliminary results ¹¹	Promo-LEX, final results
Ion Ceban (PSRM)	52.39% (123 807)	52.43%	52.39% (123 808)
Andrei Nastase (ACUM)	47.61% (112 514)	47.57%	47.61% (112 514)

¹¹ Six SMS on the protocols' data have been invalidated.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

para. – paragraph
LPA – local public administration
art. – article
ACUM Bloc –ACUM: DA and PAS Platform electoral bloc
PEB – precinct electoral bureau
c. – commune
CEC – Central Electoral Commission
IC – independent candidate
let. - letter
OM – observation mission
mun. – municipality
no. - number
city - city
TO – territorial organization
LTO – long-term observer
STO – short-term observer
PCRM – Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova
PDM – Democratic Party of Moldova
PL – Liberal Party
PLDM – Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova
PN – Our Party, Political Party
PNL – National Liberal Party
PPDA – Democracy at Home, Political Party
PPEM – European People’s Party of Moldova, Political Party
PPR – Romanian People’s Political Party
PPS – Political Party of Sor
PPVP – The Will of the People, Political Party
PSRM – Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova
PUN – The Party of National Unity
PV – protocol
REO – Registry of electoral officials
v. – village
SIASA - SIAS Elections system
PS – polling station
ATU – administrative-territorial unit
USAID – United States Agency for International Development
USB – Union Save Bessarabia, Political Party
ATUG – Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia

ANNEXES

Annex 1. Other incidents

Other		
Number of cases	Description	PS Number
1	Involvement of the party observers in the voting procedure	PS 1/213
2	Deficiencies related to the use of the accompanying sheet of the ID card	PS 1/ 133; SV 1/287
1	Failure to follow the procedure for canceling the votes	PS 1/77
1	Failure to follow the procedure for vote counting	PS 1/299
1	Attempt to record video the procedure for vote counting by an observer	PS 1/22
1	Difference between the number of ballots in the ballot box and the number of voters	PS 1/145
1	PEB's refusal to accept and examine a complaint	PS 31/6
1	Lack of the list of voting applicants at their place of stay in the first round	PS 1/234
Total: 9 cases		

Annex 2. Erroneous protocols on vote counting results in the national constituency

No.	C/PS	District/settlement	Errors in formulas	Number of errors	Errors
1	01-271	Chisinau - SINGERA	Yes	2	$I = C+J$ $J = I-C$
2	01-280	Chisinau - BACIOI	Yes	2	$I = C+J$ $J = I-C$
3	01-089	Chisinau - BUIUCANI	Yes	3	$D = F+H$ $H = G1+G2$ $F = D-H$
4	01-101	Chisinau - BUIUCANI	Yes	3	$D = F+H$ $E = C-D$ $F = D-H$
5	01-214	Chisinau - RISCANI	Yes	2	$I = C+J$ $J = I-C$
6	01-243	Chisinau - RISCANI	Ye	2	$D = F+H$ $F = D-H$